Warfare History Network
Security, Asia
One although History: The final airplane Carrier battle Was Simply Epic
The Philippine sea encompasses two million square miles of the western segregate of the Pacific Ocean. It is bounded by the Philippine Islands can the west, the Mariana Islands can the east, the Caroline Islands ought the south, and the Japanese Islands ought the north. can the summer of 1944 it was the battleground of two large carrier influence forces. One of these belonged ought Japanese Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa. The other belonged ought U.S. Admiral Raymond Spruance, and its carriers were below the tactical direction of Marc Mitscher. Ozawa had explicit orders ought cease the firm advance of the U.S. 5th Fleet, ought which Mitscher’s carriers belonged, over the immense Pacific sea toward Japan.
Ozawa had the majority of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s fighting fleet below his direction can the time, besides his nation of around 90 ships and submarines was when considerably smaller than the U.S. Navy’s 129 ships and submarines. He also commanded 450 carrier-based airplane that used to coordinate with 300 ground-based airplane can the Marianas.
Ozawa’s influence nation steamed east can two groups. The vanguard, comprising three little carriers, four battleships, and other vessels, plowed over the Philippine sea 100 miles ahead of the headmaster group, which was composed of six large carriers, a battleship, and a broad array of supporting vessels.
Ozawa’s tactic was simple. His vanguard used to serve although a decoy ought lure the U.S. carrier airplane when the airplane from the headmaster group, reinforced with land-based airplane can the Marianas, inflicted heavy wreck can multiple attacks.
Ozawa had no intention of letting Mitscher earth the first blow. Japanese carrier airplane had greater range than U.S. carrier aircraft, and Ozawa planned ought create the most of his advantage. can addition, Ozawa used to be able ought launch his airplane into the wind. The U.S. carriers used to dine ought carry almost and sail away from the Japanese fleet ought launch their airplane into the wind.
The capture Flops although Ozawa
What Ozawa did no know was that even ago he launched his airplane can June 19, Mitscher had derailed his project by knocking out the Japanese ground-based airplane can the Marianas more than a week earlier. Beginning can June 11, Mitscher had sent his airplane against Japanese air bases can the islands of Guam, Saipan, and Tinian can the Marianas. Sweeps can the days afterward pummeled the targets always ought pledge airplane were destroyed and airstrips although healthy damaged ought use. while the battle did start, Mitscher used to understand a two ought one advantage can aircraft. quite than Mitscher sailing into a trap, it was Ozawa who was sailing into one.
Following the American overthrow can Pearl Harbor can December 1941, the U.S. fleet had moved decisively toward establishing the world’s first carrier-centered navy, a nation that used to play a deciding segregate can the Allied victory can Midway can June 1942.
In revenge although the surprise invasion can Pearl Harbor can December 7, 1941, U.S. carrier airplane struck assistance can the Battles of the Coral sea and Midway. The Japanese failure ought carry a decisive victory can the Coral Sea, coupled with their loss can Midway, sole strengthened the Japanese dependence can the tactic of a defensive decisive victory.
Uncertainty Grows although the Japanese high Command
Meanwhile can Midway, Spruance, who had no earlier undergo with carrier-launched airplane battles, commanded work nation 16, including the carriers Enterprise and Mitscher’s Hornet. despite his inexperience, he was able ought oversee an American victory, which included the sinking of four Japanese carriers.
The Americans leapfrogged their street steadily north over the South Pacific, and the Japanese worked ought construct up their navy, waiting and watching although an hazard although kantai kessen, the battle they believed used to direct ought the destruction of American naval strength and decide the interval of the war. That opportunity, they used to at final decide, had convert can June 1944 can the Philippine Sea.
By 1944, however, the Japanese high direction feared its capability ought battle and carry such a kantai kessen battle was slipping away. Imperial fleet aircrews had suffered earnest losses, specially of expert pilots can Coral Sea, Midway, and during the Solomon Islands campaigns. These were losses they could no easily replace, when the United States could easily replace its losses.
By the summer of 1944, the Americans had worked their street north sufficiently that they were preparing ought invade the Mariana Islands. The Marianas, situated 700 miles south of the Japanese family islands, controlled the sea lanes ought Japan. The capture of the islands used to award the United States control of these sea lanes and used to also attitude the U.S. Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers within outstanding distance of the Japanese family islands. Japan had ought hinder the loss of the Marianas and cease the American advance north.
Mitscher’s work nation 58
Still looking although the decisive victory that nation aim the battle can the Pacific, the Japanese began eyeing Mitscher’s work nation 58. The work nation comprised five invasion groups, each composed of three or four carriers and supporting ships. The ships of each invasion gang sailed can a turn formation with the carriers can the heart and the supporting ships sailing near ought the carriers consequently they could add their antiaircraft dismiss ought that of the carriers and assist ward off any attacking aircraft. while below invasion by torpedo aircraft, the work gang used to carry toward the oncoming airplane ought border invasion angles. can addition, the carriers used to no receive evasive constitution while below attack, which allowed more firm platforms although the antiaircraft dismiss of complete the ships can the work group. Mitscher had introduced many of these tactics.
In June 1944, work nation 58 was segregate of Spruance’s 5th Fleet. The ships can sea were designated work nation 58 below Spruance and work nation 38 below Admiral William Halsey. The six-month call changes and apparent shifting of personnel can this two-platoon system had some advantage can confusing the Japanese, who can epoch were unsure although ought the genuine size of the American force.
Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander of the Combined Japanese Fleet, had been killed can March 1944 while his aircraft crashed can a typhoon. He was replaced with Admiral Soemu Toyoda, a torpedo and naval artillery expert who had been opposed ought battle with the United States, a battle he had considered unwinnable. despite this belief, Toyoda continued ought ripen the invasion plans that Koga had been working on, plans aimed can a decisive victory.
The Japanese fleet Rendezvous can the Philippine Sea
On June 11, Mitscher’s carriers launched their first air strikes can the Marianas, and Toyoda became conscious that the showdown can the Central Pacific was can hand. Japan had ought preserve Saipan, and the sole feasible defense, he believed, was ought descend the U.S. 5th fleet that was covering the landing.
The Japanese fleet Ozawa commanded consisted of three large carriers (Taiho, Shokaku, and Zuikaku), two converted carriers (Junyo and Hiyo), and four glitter carriers (Ryuho, Chitose, Chiyoda, and Zuiho). Ozawa’s fleet also included five battleships (Yamato, Musashi, Kongo, Haruna, and Nagato), 13 heavy cruisers, six glitter cruisers, 27 destroyers, six oilers, and 24 submarines. Ozawa commanded from aboard the Taiho, which was the first Japanese carrier ought dine been built with an armor-plated flight deck, which was designed ought oppose bomb hits.
The commanders can the U.S. 5th fleet had 956 carrier-based planes available ought them. can addition, Ozawa’a pilots sole had almost 25 percent of the drill and undergo the American pilots had, and he was working with inferior equipment. His ships had antiaircraft guns, although example, besides lacked the new proximity fuses, which provided a more complex triggering apparatus than the commonplace face fuses or timed fuses did, also although good radar.
The Japanese fleet rendezvoused June 16 can the western segregate of the Philippine Sea. Japanese airplane did dine a superior range can that time, though, which allowed them ought hire the American carriers beyond the range of American aircraft. They could invasion can 300 miles and could search a radius of 560 miles, when the American Hellcat fighters were limited ought an invasion range of 200 miles and a search range of 325 miles. Additionally, with their island bases can the area, the Japanese believed their airplane could invasion the U.S. fleet and then earth can the island airfields. They could so shuttle between the islands and the attack, and the U.S. fleet used to be receiving punishment with sole a limited capability ought respond.
A chief battle can the Horizon…
The American air raids can the Marianas continued over June 15, and U.S. ships began an additional bombardment of the islands. can June 15, three divisions of American troops, two Marine divisions and one troops division, went ashore can Saipan, and Toyoda committed almost the complete Japanese fleet ought a counterattack. Toyoda wired Ozawa that he was ought invasion the Americans and annihilate their fleet. “The arise and autumn of Imperial Japan depends can this one battle,” Toyoda wrote.
The U.S. submarines Flying Fish and Seahorse sighted the Japanese fleet finish the Philippines can June 15. The Japanese ships did no finish refueling until two days later. Based can those sightings, Spruance quickly decided a chief battle was can hand. He ordered Mitscher’s work nation 58, which had sent two of its carrier work groups north ought intercept airplane reinforcements from Japan, ought reform and impress west of Saipan into the Philippine Sea. Mitscher was aboard his flagship, the carrier Lexington, which Tokyo Rose used to erroneously clarify can on least two occasions ought dine been sunk. Spruance was aboard the heavy cruiser Indianapolis.
Task nation 58 comprised five invasion groups. Deployed before the carriers ought constitution although an antiaircraft conceal was the battle gang of Vice Admiral Willis Lee (Task gang 58.7), which contained seven battleships (Lee’s flagship the Washington, also although the North Carolina, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Alabama), and eight heavy cruisers (Baltimore, Boston, Canberra, Wichita, Minneapolis, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Spruance’s Indianapolis). just north of them was the weakest of the carrier groups, Rear Admiral William K. Harrill’s work gang 58.4. This gang was composed of sole one fleet carrier (Essex) and two glitter carriers (Langley and Cowpens).
“Let’s do It Properly Tomorrow”
To the east, can a row running north ought south, were three additional invasion groups, each containing two fleet carriers and two glitter carriers. This was Rear Admiral Joseph Clark’s work gang 58.1, which consisted of the Hornet, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, and Bataan, Rear Admiral Alfred Montgomery’s work gang 58.2 (Bunker Hill, Wasp, Cabot, and Monterey), and Rear Admiral John W. Reeves’s work gang 58.3 (Enterprise, Lexington, San Jacinto, and Princeton). These ships were supported by 13 glitter cruisers, 58 destroyers, and 28 submarines. The invasion groups were deployed 12 ought 15 miles apart.
Eight older battleships across with smaller accompany carriers below the direction of Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf remained finish Saipan ought protect the invasion fleet and supply air assistance although the landings.
On the afternoon of June 18, search planes sent out from the Japanese fleet located the American work force, and Rear Admiral Sueo Obayashi, commander of three of the Japanese carriers, directly launched fighters. He quickly received a information from Ozawa, however, recalling the fighters. “Let’s do it properly tomorrow,” Ozawa wrote.
Later that night, the Americans also detected the Japanese ships moving toward them. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, alerted Spruance that a Japanese dispatch had broken radio silence and a information apparently sent by Ozawa ought his land-based air troops can Guam had been intercepted. A patch obtained can that information placed the Japanese some 355 miles west-southwest of work nation 58. Mitscher requested permission from Spruance ought impress work nation 58 west during the night, which used to by twilight attitude it can attitude ought invasion the approaching Japanese fleet. “We knew we were going ought dine hell slugged out of us can the morning [and] we knew we couldn’t achieve them,” Captain Arleigh Burke, a member of Mitscher’s staff, said afterward while discussing that request.
But after considerable consideration, Spruance denied Mitscher permission ought create the move. “If we were doing something consequently significant that we were attracting the competitor ought us, we could equip ought allow him convert and receive anxiety of him while he arrived,” Spruance said.
Carrier Commanders Spruance & Mitscher
This resolution was distant various from decisions Spruance had made can Midway. There he had advocated directly attacking the competitor even ago his hold influence nation was fully assembled with the intention of neutralizing the Japanese carriers ago they could launch their planes, an constitution that he then considered the key ought the survival of his carriers. He used to also receive considerable criticism although missing what some were ought conceive a hazard ought destroy the Japanese fleet.
Spruance’s resolution ought object Mitscher’s application was influenced by orders from Nimitz, who had made it clean that the protection of the Marianas invasion was the headmaster mission of work nation 58.
Spruance was concerned that the Japanese impress could be an experiment ought pull his ships away from the Marianas consequently a Japanese invasion nation could then glide after it, overwhelm Oldendorf’s force, and destroy the landing fleet. Locating and destroying the Japanese fleet was no his headmaster objective, and he was unwilling ought lease the headmaster influence nation of the Pacific fleet ought be drawn westward, away from the amphibious forces.
Spruance also can dine been influenced by Japanese documents that had been captured can March and described just such a proposed plan: drawing American ships that were supporting an invasion away from an island and then sweeping can after the fleet ought destroy the invading force.
Spruance and Mitscher were various commanders. though now commanding carriers, Spruance was when can heart a battleship man and, alike most of the Imperial Japanese fleet establishment, he dreamed of a ship-to-ship confrontation. although the battle of the Philippine sea loomed, Spruance early can considered sending his rapid battleships out ought encounter Ozawa can a evening constitution and had sole dropped the vision while his battleship commander, Admiral Lee, deferred. Lee had seen enough of evening actions can Guadalcanal and the Solomons.
As although Mitscher, he was a carrier man. He sat can the bridge of his flagship watching the flight deck although planes were launched and could be seen using body vocabulary ought assist them off. He had graduated from the Naval college can 1910 and had taken an early advantage can aviation, requesting a shift ought aeronautics can his final year although a midshipman. The application was denied, and he served can the destroyers Whipple and Stewart ago being stationed can the armored cruiser North Carolina, which was being used although an experimental launching platform although aircraft. Mitscher trained although a astronaut and became one of the first U.S. naval aviators can June 2, 1916.
As information almost the Japanese buildup came can and the upcoming battle loomed, Mitscher said that what was coming “might be a hell of a battle although a while,” besides added that he believed the work nation could carry it.
Search Planes can twilight can June 19
At twilight can June 18, work nation 58 launched search aircraft, battle air patrols, and antisubmarine patrols and then turned the fleet west ought carry maneuvering room away from the islands. The Japanese also launched search patrols early can the day. Those planes pinpointed the American position, and one of the Japanese planes, after locating the work force, attacked one of its destroyers. The attacking Japanese aircraft was shot down.
At twilight can June 19, Ozawa again launched search planes and located the American ships southwest of Saipan. He then launched 71 airplane from his carriers, which were followed a short time afterward by another 128 planes.
Among the U.S. fighters that used to be sent up ought encounter them were a large amount of F6F Hellcats, a Grumman airplane that had been attitude into service can early 1942, at final replacing the F4F Wildcat. The Hellcat had been engineered specifically ought encounter Japanese fighters while the Americans recovered an intact Zero during the fighting can the Aleutian Islands can 1942 and were able ought engineer a fighter ought digest against it can combat. The Hellcat could outclimb and outdrive the Japanese Zero and was heavily armed. can addition, its astronaut was protected by heavy armor plating, self-sealing fuel tanks, and a bulletproof windshield, which made it commonplace with the fleet pilots.
The American pilots who used to face the Japanese also had can least two years of drill and 300 hours of flying undergo although opposed ought the Japanese pilots, who had can most six months of drill and a little flying hours. They were obscure copies of the pilots who had flown against the American foundation can Pearl Harbor and the American fleet can Midway.
A large battle can The heaven and can The Water
At 10 am, radar aboard the American ships picked up the first wave of Japanese attackers. American fighters that had been sent ought raid Guam were called assistance ought the fleet, and can 10:23 am Mitscher ordered work nation 58 ought carry into the wind. complete available fighters were sent up ought hope the Japanese. He then attitude his bomber airplane aloft ought orbit vacant waters ought the east ought fly the hazard of a Japanese bomb influence into a hangar deck complete of aircraft.
The approaching Japanese planes were first spotted by a gang of 12 Hellcats from the Belleau timber almost 72 miles out from the American fleet where they had paused ought regroup. The Belleau timber planes tore into the Japanese planes there and were instantly joined by other American fighter groups. Twenty-five of the Japanese planes were quickly knocked out of the sky, and then 16 more.
As the Japanese and American fighters dove can each other, apparatus guns blazing, 70 miles west of the American fleet, a little of the Japanese planes were able ought interval away and task their street over ought the American ships. They attacked the picket destroyers Yarnall and Stockham, causing sole a little amount of damage. besides one Japanese bomber was able ought carry over the American defenses and scored a do defeat can the headmaster deck of the battleship South Dakota. More than 50 of her crew were killed or injured, besides the dispatch remained operational.
Only one Hellcat was lost can the fighting. can 11:07 am, radar detected a second wave of 107 Japanese airplane approaching. American fighters met this attacking gang when it was when 60 miles out, and 70 of the attackers were shot down ago they reached the work force. Of those that did carry through, six attacked the American fleet, almost hitting two of the carriers and causing some casualties ago four of that six were brought down. A little gang of torpedo planes also attacked the carrier Enterprise and the glitter carrier Princeton, besides complete were shot down. Altogether, 97 of those 107 attacking Japanese airplane were destroyed.
“Great Marianas Turkey Shoot”
A third invasion consisting of 47 Japanese airplane came can the American ships can almost 1 pm. Forty U.S. fighters intercepted the invasion gang 50 miles out and shot down seven of the Japanese planes. A little again broke over defenses ought invasion the American ships besides caused little or no damage. The 40 remaining Japanese airplane fled the scene.
The Japanese fleet had also launched an additional attack, besides somehow those planes had been given incorrect coordinates although the place of the American fleet and were originally unable ought find the ships. Eighteen of those airplane did at final stumble can some of the American ships although they were heading assistance ought Guam and attacked. U.S. fighters shot down half of them when the remaining planes were able ought invasion the Wasp and Bunker range besides failed ought score any hits. Eight of these Japanese planes were also shot down. Meanwhile, the surplus of this aborted invasion nation were intercepted by 27 American Hellcats although they were landing can Guam and 30 more were shot down. Nineteen others were damaged beyond repair.
“Hell, this is alike an old-time turkey shoot,” said Lexington Commander Paul Buie,
creating the nickname, “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” which used to afterward be pinned can the battle by the men who were fighting it.
The Japanese had lost 346 airplane during the day’s fighting, when the Americans had lost 15 and, aside from the casualties can the South Dakota, had suffered sole negligible wreck ought their ships.
Submarines can The Water
The astronaut with the highest score of the engagement was Captain David McCampbell of the Essex, who used to advance can ought carry the U.S. fleet ’s all-time headmaster ace with 34 confirmed kills during the battle and used to carry the Medal of Honor although his actions can the battle of the Philippine Sea. can June 19, he had downed five Japanese D4Y “Judy” carrier-based dive bombers. He used to also notch two Zero fighters afterward can the engagement during an afternoon influence can Guam.
Lieutenant Alex Vraciu of the Lexington, the top-ranked fleet ace can the time with 12 victories, downed six Judys of the second wave can almost eight minutes, and Ensign Wilbur “Spider” Webb, a modern shift ought fighters from bombers, attacked a flight of Aichi dive bombers can Guam, also downing six. Webb returned safely ought the carrier Hornet, besides the gunners aboard the Japanese bombers had shot his aircraft consequently complete of holes that it was judged a complete loss.
The destruction wrought can the air was no the sole wreck done ought the Japanese that day. when the air battle was taking place, another battle was being fought can and below the surface of the sea.
At 8 am t
